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Abstract Through a discourse analysis of four commercially successful 
Bollywood films between 2012-2013, this paper investigates Bollywood’s 
role in creation of hierarchical identities in the Indian society wherein 
Muslims occupy the position of the inferior ‘other’ to the superior Hindu 
‘self’. Focusing on Muslim heroines, the paper demonstrates that the 
selected narratives attempt to move away from the older binary identity 
narratives of Muslim women such as nation vs. religion and hyper-
sexualised courtesan vs. subservient veiled women,  towards identity 
narratives borne out of Muslim women’s choice of education, career and 
life partner, political participation, and embodied practices. However, in 
comparison to signs of change the sites of continuity are strongly 
embedded in the religious-nationalistic meta-narrative that drives the 
paradigms of Indian femininity/ womanhood. To conclude, the nature of 
the recent deployment of Muslim heroines in Bollywood  reinforce the 
hierarchy between the genders (male-female), between the communities 
(Hindu-Muslim) and between nations (India- Pakistan).  
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Introduction 
On the 3rd of July 2013, India's top investigation agency, the Central 
Bureau of Investigation (CBI),  told a court that police and intelligence 
officials from the state of Gujarat killed 19 year old Muslim student, 
Ishrat Jahan, and three male companions in a ‘staged’ encounter in 2004. 
The Gujrat police on its part continues to allege that Ishrat and her 
companions were in fact ‘terrorists’ (BBC 2013; Ayub 2013). Commonly 
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referred to as Ishrat Jahan fake encounter case, this has since spiraled 
into a political slugfest that has exposed fault lines around issues of 
terrorism, nationalism, Muslim identity and gender in India. A 
spokesperson of the then key opposition party in India, Minakshi Lekhi, 
asserted on Times Now TV channel that ‘here was a girl travelling with 
men unrelated to her’. She further added, since Ishrat came from a 
deprived background, she was a ‘fit case’ for being a terrorist (Viz 
2013). These statements come vis-a-vis the CBI’s report ascertaining the 
staged character of encounters and the alleged ‘terror links’ of those 
killed are yet to be established. Even though Lekhi’s deeply sexist and 
communally presumptuous statement was widely criticised, she found 
ample political support demonstrating some of the techniques deployed 
in creating a Muslim ‘other’ particularly through the body of the Muslim 
woman in India (Viz 2013). Since then with the triumph of the Hindu 
supremacist Bharatiya Janta Party (BJP) in May 2014, the voices othering 
Muslims and other minorities through the body of the Muslim women 
have not only become louder, but have also become more mainstream. 
For instance, the 'Bahu lao, beti Bachao campaign' being run by Rashtriya 
Swamsevak Sangh, Bajrang Dal, Viswa Hindu Parishad – affiliates of the 
ruling party (Indian Express, 13 March 2015) which asks Hindu men to 
marry Muslim girls and purify them (read: convert to Hinduism) as a 
measure to deter Muslim men from marrying Hindu women – a 
phenomenon popularly referred to as Love Jihad. These ‘real’ incidents 
remind us of the gendered nature of India’s communities and the deeply 
religious nature of Indian nationalism highlighting key issues and 
identifying areas of future reflections under the theme of gender, 
nationalism and religion in India.  
In this article, we use the example of Bollywood’s representation of 
Muslim women given its global recognition and its position as an 
influential cultural product, which both constructs and disseminates the 
important paradigm of ‘Indian-ness’ and ‘collective identity’ (Mishra, 
2006; Ansari, 2008; Osuri and Ghosh, 2012). In fact, its widespread local 
and global reach heightens Bollywood's significance as a potent 
discursive tool that serves the purpose of legitimizing (and illegitimating) 
certain identity claims. Our research findings suggest that, in recent 
times, there have been several cinematic attempts to somewhat re-cast 
female Muslim characters as the 'new age girl who does not desist from 
bending the conservative (Muslim) societal norms' (Daily Mail, 15 Feb 
2013). However, these ‘new’ representations of Muslim women in 
Bollywood neither challenge stereotypes about Muslims subordinate 
position through their portrayals as anti-nation or as the ‘other’ (Hirji, 
2008; Khan, 2009; Jain, 2011; Kumar, 2013) nor do they offer a nuanced 
picture of the association of Muslim religious practices with women’s 
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experiences of gender injustice (Agnes, 2012; Sachar, 2006; Kandiyoti, 
1994). 
Our overarching aim is to contribute towards discussions on intersection 
of religion, nationalism and gender, in imagining and representing 
Muslim women in India. Specifically in this article, we argue that such 
representations create a hierarchy of identities wherein Hindu identities 
get classed as the 'superior' and Muslims as the inferior ‘other’. Following 
Das (2006), we argue further that Bollywood’s strategic deployment of 
Muslim women becomes a ‘discursive apparatus' of  maintaining a 
communalised, Hindu patriarchal social structure at three inter-
connected levels: among the genders (ordering of women by men); 
among communities (bordering between Hindu and Muslim communal 
identities) and, inter-state othering between Indian and Pakistani 
identities’ (Das 2006: 373). 
Within the time frame of 2012-2013, we found four commercially 
successful, mainstream Bollywood movies released which portrayed 
Muslim women as the primary heroine of the movie. In two of these 
movies, Ek Tha Tiger (2012) and Agent Vinod (2012), the Muslim women 
characters are represented as Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) 
spies in love with Indian Research and Analysis (RAW) agents. In the 
other two movies, Ishaqzaade (2012) and Raanjhanaa (2013),  the 
Muslim women characters are represented as small town Muslim girls 
from north India with an active interest in politics.  
In our study, we adopted the methodological approach of critical 
discourse analysis: ‘looking at narratives of movies as active in 
constructing social reality offering definitions and categorisations which 
are linked to wide social and cultural structures, relations and processes’ 
(Aapola 1997: 50).  Our focus in this article is the discourse (discours) 
instead of the story (histoire) of the plots of the movies- a conceptual 
distinction popularised by film theorist Christian Metz in his seminal 
essay entitled 'Story/Discourse (a Note on Two Kinds of Voyeurism) 
published in 1975. For Metz (1975), discourse is the rhetorical dimension 
of the story, i.e. the way it is made to persuade and manipulate the 
audience, in contrast to the story itself that seems to exist in its own 
world. Using the narratives of female Muslim characters in the selected 
movies, we demonstrate that certain hegemonic discourses around the 
nation, religion and gender are legitimised for the audience of these 
movies. By exploring this intersection of narratives on gender, nations 
and religion, within the narrative plots of the movies and the 
characterisation of the central characters, we attempt to contribute to 
the existing literature on the construction of national identity through 
women’s representation in popular culture.   
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Our analysis is divided under three broad types of narratives drawn from 
the characters of the Muslim women in the selected movies: the first 
concerns Narratives of Choice, which includes various aspects of Muslim 
women’s lives such as cross-cultural love, career, education, etc. The 
second considers Narratives of Political Participation, which explores the 
representation of Pakistani Muslim women in a non-traditional role of 
spies. This section critically examines the dynamic between the tendency 
of representing Muslim women as sexualised damsel(s) or as agents of 
political change. The final theme of the Narratives of sartorial display 
delves into the stereotypical embodied representation (through clothing 
practices) of Muslim women in contrast to the Hindu women, which 
depicts the non-nationalist/anti-nationalist vs. nationalist dichotomy of 
the two sets of women.  Our analysis frequently sets the Muslim 
characters in opposition to the Hindu characters of the selected movies 
to identify the depiction of generalised differences among them with 
respect to their relation to the Indian nation, their religion and their role 
in intercultural relationships. For example, how the Hindu women choose 
the nation as their primary identity while the Muslim women often 
choose their religion, and how such binary associations of these women 
make intercultural alliances impossible.  
 
Muslims in India: the real and the imagined 
The 2006 Sachar Committee report, prepared by the Prime Minister’s 
High Level Committee, concluded that a large proportion of the Muslim 
population of India suffer from severe deprivation in many social, 
economic and educational areas, as well as suspicion of their patriotism. 
The report also says that Muslims carry the twin burden of being labeled 
as anti-national yet being appeased at the same time. This, according to 
the report, has caused strong resentment among Muslims towards their 
stereotypical representations perpetuated by the media (Sachar, 2006: 
11-12). 
In her article, which discusses the relationship between women and 
nation, Deniz Kandiyoti (1994) argues that multi-religious nation-states 
like India form state policies under the name of a secular state, that are 
substantially influenced by the norms, values, and lifestyles of the 
dominant religious group (Hindu), irrespective of the features of the 
other religions of the state. According to research done by Maidul Islam 
the identity of a ‘Muslim Other’ in the Indian public discourse is also 
influenced by decade-long resurgence of Hindutva1  (Islam, 2007). The 
                                                                    
1 Hindutva (‘Hinduness’, a word coined by Vinayak Damodar Savarkar in his 1923 
pamphlet entitled Hindutva: Who is a Hindu? ) is the set of movements 
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Hindutva discourse views Islam as the sole locus of Muslim women’s 
poor socio-economic status, ignoring the persistent and instituationalised 
deprivation of Muslims in India. The Sachar Report further confirms that:   
‘The obsessive focus on select cases of Muslim women 
passionately discussed in the media results in identifying the 
Muslim religion as the sole locus of gender injustice in the 
Community. Consequently, the civil society and the State 
locate Muslim women’s deprivation not in terms of the 
‘objective’ reality of societal discrimination and faulty 
development policies, but in the religious-community space. 
This allows the State to shift the blame to the Community and 
to absolve itself of neglect.’ (Sachar, 2006: 12-13) 
In addition to the Ishrat Jahan fake encounter case, several feminist 
authors use the 1985 case of a divorced Muslim Woman, Shah Bano, as 
an example of how the Hindu supremacist discourse uses the ‘plight’ of 
the Muslim woman as a tactical instrument to repress the religious 
freedom of the minority and to ensure its own dominance (Agnes, 2012; 
Kirmani, 2009; Kandiyoti, 2004). It is noteworthy that Shah Bano won a 
case in India’s supreme court granting her maintenance rights from her 
husband after separation.  However, the adverse comments in the 
judgement against the Prophet Muhammad and Islam created a highly 
disempowering binary choice between ‘Islam’ and ‘gender equity’ for 
Shah Bano and for other Muslim women fighting for their right. Public 
furor and the possible pressure of being seen as “anti-Muslim” forced 
Shah Bano to choose her Muslim loyalty over her legal rights by rejecting 
the judgment in her favor. Similarly, during the 2002 Gujarat Riots, 
Muslim women’s bodies were subject to endless violence, with plural and 
new forms of torture, as with other ethnic conflicts elsewhere in the 
world. The Gujarat Riots that killed over 1,000 people, mostly Muslims, 
destroyed 20,000 Muslim homes and displaced roughly 150,000 people 
from their homes was unique in its ‘state sponsored veracity’ of violence 
against Muslim women (BBC, 2004; New York Times, 2014; Varadrajan, 
2003). However, the gruesome sexual injustice inflicted on Muslim 
women during this period was turned into a response to historic and 
current Hindu grievances, which justified the communal carnage (Agnes, 
2012; Anand, 2007). As we now see in the recent Ishrat Jahan fake 
encounter case, Ishrat’s identity as a Muslim woman – more so than any 
                                                                      
advocating Hindu nationalism/supremacy in India. In India, an umbrella 
organisation called the Sangh Parivar champions the concept of Hindutva. The 
sangh comprises organisations such as the Rashtriya Swayamsevak 
Sangh (RSS), Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), Bajrang Dal, and the Vishwa Hindu 
Parishad.  
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other aspect of her identity –  automatically made her a suspect for going 
against the Hindu moral order of the Indian nation.  
Bollywood, as a popular cultural medium, can be seen to disseminate and 
reinforce this popular ideology of mistrust and suspicion towards the 
Muslim community of India. Bollywood movies have in essence created 
stereotypical images of Muslim characters with clichéd forms of cultural 
and religious symbols like ‘beard’ and ‘caps’ for men and conservative 
Islamic headscarf or ‘burqa’ for women creating a monolithic portrayal of 
the community. Simultaneously, these portrayals completely ignore the 
regional and socio-economic differences within the community. The 
portrayal of Muslim men as terrorists, villains and gangsters has also 
been a recurrent theme in Bollywood movies (Islam, 2007: 405-406). 
During the 1990s, the depictions of rogue Muslims were restricted to 
Kashmiri separatists and their sympathisers along with  the 
underworld/mafia concentrated in Mumbai. Many films during this 
period told the story of the Indian (predominantly Hindu) family 
threatened by the Islamic terrorist, thus demonising the Muslim ‘other’ 
(Hirji 2008; Jain, 2011; Rajagopal, 2011). In fact, in most movies 
Hinduism and its cultural symbols came across as ‘the norm’ through the 
elimination of the other religions in the country (Rajagopal, 2011). This 
coincided with the coming to power of the Bharatia Janata Party in India 
with its strong Hindutva identity created in the 1990s through the Ram 
Janmabhoomi2 movement, and the subsequent demolition of the Babri 
Masjid and the associated communal riots. The Muslim as terrorist genre 
of movie became popular in the 1990s and themes has been elaborated 
and diversified in recent times with specific references to the trans-
national nature of terror since the events of 9/11 in the USA.  For 
example, in Faana (2006), one of Bollywood’s biggest stars Amir Khan 
plays the role of a  Kashmiri separatist named Rehan acting violently 
against the Indian nation. Although the political ideology of Azadi 
(independence) from India is mentioned in passing in the film, it is 
framed from the beginning as being in contrast to the patriotism of the 
Muslim female lead Zooni and her school teacher parents, who are 
showcased as the co-opted depoliticised ‘Good Muslims’ in Mamdani’s 
(2004) formulation. Needless to say the character of Rehan in narrative 
plot is the embodiment of  Mamadani’s  fanatical ‘Bad Muslim’ that 
frequently challenges “national order of things” (Malkki 1992: 34). The 
plot of the ‘story’ of Fanna appears to occur in isolation from the 
                                                                    
2 Janmabhomi is a movement of various Hindu political and religious 
organisations to reclaim what is believed to be the Ram Janmabhoomi (or birth 
place of the Hindu deity Ram) from the Babri Masjid (mosque) constructed by 
Mughal ruler Babar. It culminated into the demolition of the Babri Masjid in 
Ayodhya my mobs and subsequent anti Muslim riots in many parts of India.  
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complex political realities and people’s ideological positionings in 
Kashmir, by labelling all forms of political dissent from Kashmiris as 
terrorism or anti-nationalism towards India. This theme has frequently 
been replicated in many plots of movies churned out by Bollywood in the 
1990s, 2000s and after, where Kashmiris have been replaced by Indian 
Muslims, and acts of political descent and disagreement with the Indian 
state is labelled as anti-nationalism, constructing a patriot vs. terrorist, 
dichotomy. 
In the patriot-terrorist binary, as in the Good Muslim-Bad Muslim binary, 
it appears that only trustworthy Muslims are those who place India first. 
Notably the title character in Fiza, Sarfarosh’s Salim, Mission Kashmir’s 
Inayat Khan and Faana’s Zooni, are all religiously devout and uncritically 
patriotic. The good vs. bad dichotomy also encompasses the tradition vs. 
modern and religious vs. secular dichotomies wherein Muslims embodied 
by the terrorists, the mafia dons, lecherous Nawab,3 and so on get 
presented as inherently incompatible with values of modernity, 
democracy and secularism that the post-colonial Indian state espouses 
for. In contrast, Hinduism comes to be presented as the philosophy that 
embraces modernity, plurality and secularism, leading to popular views 
such as ‘India is secular because Hindus respect the other views’ stated by 
BJP spokesperson Ravi Shankar Prasad (Source: Zee News, 2013).  
Hindu-Muslim romances are also another common theme through which 
Muslims are represented in Bollywood. Whether it is cross border (India-
Pakistan) or within India, the fear of intermarriage caused the success of 
many Indian movies like Henna (1991), Bombay (1995), Gaadar (2001), 
Veer Zaara (2004), Fanaa (2006), etc. Movies such as these serve as a 
reminder of the impossibility of cross-border or cross-cultural love 
between Hindu-Muslim lovers (Hirji, 2008).  
The nationalist ideology of Bollywood positions Qaum (community) 
against Mulk (nation), which is declared as a synonym to Ghar (home) 
(Fazila-Yacoobali, 2002: 184). According to Fazila-Yacoobali (2002), the 
Mulk is the Hindu, middle-class, territorially distinct, efficient, 
benevolent, reasonable, forward-looking and militarily-vigilant modern 
nation-state that India aspires to be. On the other hand, Qaum is 
constructed as the antithesis of this Indian modernity. It is constructed as 
feudal and decadent, unable to keep the sufferings of the past in the 
past, unable to move forward, calcified, irrational, sentimental, 
                                                                    
3 A Nawab, is an honorific title ratified and bestowed by the reigning Mughal 
Emperor to semi-autonomous Muslim rulers of princely states in South Asia. 
"Nawab" usually refers to males; the female equivalent is "Begum" or "Nawab 
Begum". The primary duties of a Nawab was to uphold the sovereignty of the 
Mughal Emperor alongside with the administration of a certain province. 
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somewhat deranged, criminal and ultimately dangerous. Thus the 
Muslim Qaum is viewed as threatening towards the Indian modernity 
because of its association with the partition and setting up a Muslim 
Mulk-Pakistan as opposed to the imagined secular Indian Mulk.   
Much like the demonised Muslim man, the Muslim woman has often 
been incorporated into the imagination of Bollywood as the inferior 
‘other’ to the ‘ideal’ upper caste Hindu woman. This may be best 
illustrated by more substantive filmic examples of the nationalist classic, 
Mother India (1957), and the romantic classic Mughal-e-Azam (1960). 
The de-sexualised character of Radha in Mother India is the archetypical 
noble Gandhian mother-submissive, chaste, patriotic and selfless. This 
sharply contrasts with the character of Anarkali in Mughal-e-Azam, who 
is a tawaif4 (courtesan) and the ultimate demure seductress and dancer 
with whom Mughal Prince Jahangir falls in love and rebels against his 
father, Emperor Akbar. Radha is represented in a nationalistic sari, 
symbolically binding or protecting her body from vulnerability and 
permeability of access by men. While for Anarkali, despite her fully 
covered body, her breasts are often accentuated by the cut of her dress, 
her swirling dances reveal her full leg even though they are covered, and 
the only exposed parts of her body, her palms and feet are fetishised 
through long nails painted red, jewellery and elaborate dancing gestures 
using her hands and feet (Dwyer, 2000: 148). If Radha represents the 
ideal of the coherent but gendered nation, Anarkali represents the 
selfish, disruptive, rebellious and erotic presence that disrupts status quo 
of power (Ansari, 2008).  
The image of the veiled Muslim woman has gained iconic status, both in 
India and globally. It has become a trope in support of clash of 
civilisations argument between the civilised Hindus and the barbaric 
Muslims in India. Women’s dress in India is produced, performed and 
read through an opposition of putatively ‘Hindu’, thus Indian sari, and 
‘Muslim’ thus un-Indian ‘veil’5 (Osella and Osella, 2007). Controversies 
around the Kashmiri militant group Lashkar-e- Jabbar announcing that all 
Muslim women in Kashmir must wear a burqa6 became a project of 
marking and drawing inside/outside boundaries of Indian Muslims 
nationalism (Menon, 2005). Muslim women’s choice of clothes became a 
                                                                    
4 A tawaif was a courtesan who catered to the nobility of South Asia, particularly 
during the era of the Mughal Empire. The tawaifs excelled and contributed to 
music, dance (mujra), theatre, film, and the Urdu literary tradition, were 
considered an authority on etiquette.  
5 The veil is a generalised term used to refer to the practice of Muslim women 
covering the head and chest, beyond the age of puberty 
6 An enveloping outer garment worn by women in some Islamic traditions. Often 
black in colour, it covers a woman’s whole body and has a separate headscarf.  
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symbol of their rejection of nation. Such understandings, discounted a 
similar ideology of Muslims, whereby threats to Muslim communities 
identity or existence, resulted in the proud assertion of their 
communities' identity on the bodies of their women (Menon, 2005). For 
example, in the state of Kerala the practice of hijab was rare, but post the 
demolition of the Babri Mosque, it became a more widespread practice 
among Muslims to establish their greater attachment to Islamic identity, 
and a response to Hindu chauvinistic nationalism displayed through the 
events of the demolision of the mosque (Menon, 2005; Osella and 
Osella, 2007).  
Such dichotomised representation of Hindu-Muslim women appears in 
the imagery of the subservient veiled women evoked in the image of 
Muslim Pakistani woman Zara in the movie Veer Zara who always covers 
her head and wears a salwar kameez. She is indebted to the Hindu hero 
for saving her life and falls in love with him, only to suffer further by her 
countrymen’s conspiracy to separate her from her lover for many years.  
She is shown to be passive and subservient, in need of protection from 
the brutish Muslim man. Unlike the dangerous Muslim man, the Muslim 
women in Bollywood, particularly post 9/11, are shown to have some 
possibility of redemption through an allegiance to the nationalistic 
agenda. For instace, Zooni (in Faana) sacrifices an earthly love for her 
lover who is a terrorist/separatist for a larger transcendental love of the 
nation, much like Mother India described earlier. In doing so, she creates 
a space for herself and her son as depoliticised ‘good Muslims’ within the 
nationalist space of India (Khan 2009). 
By assigning an intense image of the ‘dangerous other’ or the ‘inferior 
other’ Kumar (2013) suggests that the image of a Muslim in Indian films 
have sociologically broadened the definition of Islamic terrorism. 
Reducing the discursive space accorded to Muslims in India and 
elsewhere making them more vulnerable to social ostracism, state 
violence and mob fury. ‘The vileness of the present discourse is such that 
it has Muslims forever on the defensive, which is precisely the agenda of 
Hindutva and all such forms of authoritarian ideology’ (Kumar, 2013: 
464). In the following sections we illustrate the changes seen in the 
recent portrayals in of Muslim women in Bollywood under the heading of 
the three dominant narratives of change. We also scrutinise the nature of 
these changes in then in larger narratives of gender and religion within 
the paradigms of Indian identity.  
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Creating the lived 'other' through representations in celluloid 
Narratives of Choice: Cross-cultural love, education and public mobility  
All the Muslim women characters from the selected movies, Iram in 
Agent Vinod,  Ek Tha Tiger’s Zoya, Ranjhanaa’s Zoya and Ishaqzade’s 
Zoya are represented as educated and mobile in the public sphere either 
for education, jobs or political campaigning. It is interesting to note, 
though outside the scope of the current article that the culturally and 
geographically specific name ‘Zoya’ has assumed such popularity in 
Bollywood’s characterisation of Muslim women. These recent portrayals 
of the Muslim heroines as cosmopolitan women is a leap forward from 
the movies of previous generations, where Muslim women were either 
depicted as the seductress (courtesan) or the subservient veiled victim of 
religion. For example, Zoya in Raanjhanaa explicitly seeks to attend a 
University in Delhi outside her home town of Benaras/Aligarh to escape 
her conservative Muslim family. Her character in fact attributes her 
metamorphosis into a confident politically aware woman to her 
association with the secular educational system and a supportive non-
Muslim lover. Ishaqzade’s Zoya, is also shown to be campaigning for her 
father's political party, wearing a waistcoat just like her brothers’ who 
join her in the campaign, and is represented as bold, vocal and aggressive 
in her political pursuit. In fact, she is shown to be fearless in front of the 
hero’s gun in the movie, challenging him to shoot her. Such depiction of 
Muslim heroines are certainly a change from what Hirji (2008) called the 
‘mysterious figures who veer between innocent damsel in distress or 
exotic seductress’. 
With the exception of Iram in Agent Vinod, all the other three characters, 
Ek Tha Tiger’s Zoya, Ranjhanaa’s Zoya and Ishaqzade’s Zoya appear to 
actively choose life partners from ‘forbidden’ or ‘enemy groups’, namely 
a Hindu Tiger, a Sikh Jasjeet and again a Hindu and a political opponent 
Perma. While Ranjhanaa’s Zoya and Ishaqzade’s Zoya have tragic love 
stories ending in the death of the two partners, Ek Tha Tiger’s Zoya  the 
Pakistani spy and her Indian lover are shown to end up being together, in 
an unnamed foreign/western country. The happy ending in Ek Tha Tiger’s 
plot can be interpreted as Zoya having greater choice and agency in 
selecting her life partner and creating a space for themselves to be 
together, although in hiding. However, this choice can also be 
interpreted as her weakness towards earthly romantic love over the 
transcendental  love for her country, thus pitting her choice of a 
Hindu/Indian lover against her choice of a Muslim nation (Pakistan).  
Additionally, the Nationalist and/or patriarchal narratives of Hindu Indian 
men protecting ‘good Muslim’ women from the ‘bad Muslim’ men is 
visible in varying degrees in all the four plots. In particular, Pakistani 
Exchanges : the Warwick Research Journal 
 294 Hussein & Hussain. Exchanges 2015 2(2), pp. 284-304 
 
woman assisting an Indian man in discharging his duties towards his 
nation also firmly makes a case for the redemption of Pakistani (Muslim) 
women through her association with a Hindu man and her encounter 
with a Hindu nation.  
A closer look at the three choices of partners in the selected sample 
reveal that the characteristics of each of these partners are associated 
with an ideal ‘Indian Hindu male’. As opposed to the Hindu men, Muslim 
masculinity in the selected movies are embodied by the brutish 
colleagues of Zoya in Ek tha Tiger, deeply conservative fathers and male 
relatives of  the two Zoyas in in Raanjhanaa and Ishaqzade. 
Contrastingly, a chivalrous Tiger gives up an opportunity to kill his 
opponent Zoya – the female Pakistani spy in Ek Tha Tiger, even though 
the male Pakistanis are not bestowed with the same kindness. This 
establishes firmly the possibility of redemption for Muslim/Pakistani 
women through encounters with the Hindu men and the Hindu nation as 
discussed earlier in the context of the “Bahu lao, beti Bachao campaign” 
in some parts of India.  On the other hand in Ranjhana, Zoya’s childhood 
sweetheart Kundan is depicted as passionate lover waiting for years to be 
with his beloved, so much so that he even endears himself to her family 
by doing odd jobs for them. He is shown to be gregarious and big hearted 
even in the face of Zoya’s refusal to reciprocate his feelings. Similarly, 
Ishaqzade’s Zoya falls for the misogynistic Parma when he expresses his 
desire to protect her family’s honour equated with her honour (izzat) by 
withholding from the public information that can potentially construed 
as dishonourable in the wider society.  In the plots discussed above, 
overall narratives are that of Muslim women being sheltered and 
protected by Hindu male characters embodying the chivalrous, strong, 
and virile Indian and/or Hindu masculinity as opposed to the brash, 
uncivilised and uneducated Muslim masculinity.  
These narratives about Muslim women’s choice of relationships, public 
mobility and education indirectly help solidify the age old Hindu 
supremacist narrative of disruptive Muslim masculinity. Therefore, even 
when the female Muslim characters are empowered to make ‘choices’ 
these choices are restricted within the category of benevolent and virile 
Hindu men capable of protecting the Muslim women’s and the Muslim 
community’s honour. It is also a fact that, while the celluloid depictions 
of Hindu hero rescuing Muslim heroine are very common, the reverse 
scenario involving Hindu heroine and a Muslim hero is still unimaginable. 
Thus continuing  two problematic traditions: firstly, that of emphasis on 
family and community honour embodied by Muslim women who are 
finally saved by Hindu men and secondly, that of demonisation of Muslim 
men, from whom these characters need protection. 
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Narratives of Political Participation: sexualised damsel(s) in distress or 
agents of political change? 
The most intriguing portrayals of Muslim women in the public sphere in 
the selected movies are Iram in Agent Vinod and in Ek tha Tiger 
representing Muslim heroines as strong and independent women in the 
service of their nation through espionage. Both of these characters 
demonstrate a seemingly effortless ability to fit across a range of western 
and non-western (Pakistan) social contexts by altering their clothing 
practices and demeanor, a representation rarely found in Bollywood 
before. In addition, the Indian Muslim heroines, Ranjhanaa’s Zoya is a 
student activist with a very well defined political agenda for social change 
and towards the end of the movie she becomes the leader of a radical 
political group. Ishaqzade’s Zoya is also portrayed as having strong 
political ambitions including an aspiration to become the Chief Minister 
of the state in future, making her the subject of ridicule from the male 
family members. The political ambitions Ishaqzade’s Zoya’s are 
demonstrated clearly in her actively campaigning for her father’s election 
and frequently leveraging the family’s political clout. The character of 
Iram stands out among the four in being forced into a career in 
espionage by the Pakistani secret service agency in lieu of protection 
from persecution in a false case. The other three characters seem choose 
their political or spy careers actively. However, a closer examination of 
these portrayals shows more signs of continuity in stereotypical 
representations as those needing protection of Indian (Hindu) men and 
the question of women’s position in politics is still represented to be 
embedded in a male-centered structure.  
For instance, Ishaqzade’s Zoya chooses a career in politics where she can 
leverage her family’s political clout and Ranjhanaa’s Zoya is portrayed as 
carrying forward the ideological/political vision of her dead lover. Irum 
and Ek Tha Tiger’s Zoya are used by Pakistani intelligence agency to 
forward their country’s geo-political agendas, often using their sexuality 
to distract the opposition. For instance, Iram in Agent Vinod performs a 
highly sexual courtesan inspired dance sequence to distract the enemy, 
while the hero, an Indian agent, tries to revoke a terrorist attack. Thus, 
while Muslim women’s recent portrayals in several movies depict 
elements of political participation in most cases, their feminine 
dispositions are deployed towards personal, political and nationalist 
agendas that are not always controlled by them.  
Representation of Muslim women as political agents, remain embedded 
in a patriarchal structures whereby their political agency is converted 
into sexualised narratives of damsels in distress, which ultimately helps 
maintain hierarchical power relations. Firstly, the very fact that the two 
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strongest political agents of change, recognised formally by their 
government through appointment as spies, are Pakistani and not Indian 
Muslim women. Their Pakistani identity frees them from the inevitable 
comparison with the ideal Hindu upper caste women as the benchmark 
against which Indian Muslim women are measured. Thus they are 
represented with greater agency, especially with regards to the diverse 
dressing practices and practices of espionage at home and in foreign 
lands. Whereas, the Indian Muslim heroines are able to practice their 
political agency mostly within the restricted frameworks of family honour 
and shame. Secondly, pairing of Pakistani female character with Indian 
male characters in the lead allows these films to successfully maintain 
the communalised, militarised and a Hindu patriarchal social structure 
among the genders, and between nation states (Das, 2006). This is 
captured first in both portrayals by Agent Vinod’s Iram & Ek Tha Tiger’s 
Zoya as damsels in distress who are then the recipients of Hindu male 
magnanimity and benevolence. In both cases, the notion that perhaps 
the female spies are as well trained as the their male counterparts is 
ignored largely in a way that focuses somehow on their gender 
disposition which requires ‘protection’.  
Though the discussed portrayals of Pakistani women in Bollywood 
denote some stereotypical representation of Muslim women, they also 
assume a futuristic political agenda wherein unlike the older India-
Pakistan related movies the emphasis on partition and Kashmir dispute 
are much more muted. In fact there is a lot of emphasis in the narrative 
plots of these movies to show that India has moved on from Partition of 
India and Pakistan, but Pakistan has not. Therefore, Bollywood portrayals 
carry forward singular and simple construction of Hindu nation and 
Indians as peace loving, responsible and often taking a paternal attitude 
to the actions of an irresponsible, fundamentalist and tactless Muslim 
nation Pakistan. 
 
Narratives of sartorial display: Nationalist vs. Anti-Nationalist Clothing   
The Hindu Indian women in the selected films always wear a sari, while 
none of the Muslim characters are ever represented in a sari. Muslim 
characters only wear salwar kameez,7 headscarf8 or western attires in the 
four films. Absence of representation of Muslim women in a sari marks 
them as the inferior ‘other’, and the headscarf, often generalised as the 
Muslim women’s ‘veil’, is the emblem of those who are ‘totally’ the other 
                                                                    
7 Salwar Kameez is a long tunic like top, with loose trousers and a scarf.  
8 Headscarves or head scarves are scarves covering most or all of the top of a 
Muslim woman's hair and her head, leaving face uncovered.  
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to the nationalist Hindu women in a sari (Dwyer, 2000). Ranjhanaa’s 
Zoya and Ishaqzade’s Zoya, both from small towns in India, are most 
often shown in salwar kameez in contrast to the western attire adorned 
by the two Pakistani spies Iram and Ek Tha Tiger’s Zoya. Ishaqzaade’s 
Zoya wearing a waistcoat over her kameez, can be viewed as symbol of 
Muslim League’s politics in colonial India.  While Ranjhaana’s Zoya wear 
a long kurta (tunic) and leggings or jeans with a scarf around her neck 
and sometimes a waistcoat, coat or a sweater mixing eastern and 
western attire, only when she is away from her family, at her university.  
Gender analysis of nationalism demonstrate how communities vest their 
‘honor’ on women’s bodies which reproduces the boundaries of 
ethnic/nationalist groups (Yuval-Davis, 1989). Traditional Indian garb, 
like the sari- communicate positive attributes of ‘honesty’, ‘obedience’ 
and represent the nation. It is a form of banal nationalism of Hindu 
Indian women through their sartorial practices, in the sense that it is 
everywhere and unnoticed (Wilton, 2012). The Sari is also connected to 
the religious traditions of images of the Hindu goddesses, reinforcing the 
identification of the sari with ideals of Hindu womanhood (Wilton, 2012; 
Tarlo 2007). However, Dwyer (2000) argues that many Muslim women 
historically wore the sari and still do, but remain outside nationalist 
discourses presented through women’s sartorial practices in Bollywood 
films. Thus Muslim women’s choice of rejecting the sari becomes 
representative of rejecting the nation. Western clothing also represent a 
challenge to Indian sartorial conventions, whereby Hindu nationalists still 
prefer the sari, while the young ‘modern’ women prefer Western style 
clothing (Wilton, 2012).  Western clothes are still considered more 
‘revealing’ than the sari, and thus only acceptable among unmarried 
younger women (Dwyer, 2000). But, a shift is evident in the young, 
professional and urban Indian woman’s choice of clothing in India, 
whereby in Indian newspapers and magazines most of the women are 
pictured in western-style clothing (Wilton, 2012). This is also reflected in 
Bollywood where heroines are now tall, thin Caucasian looking young 
girls often with blue eyes, fair skin and a western accent dressed in 
western style clothing conveying a modern and cosmopolitan look, able 
to shift comfortably between different global contexts and settings (Bahl, 
2005: 106). 
All Muslim heroines represented in the sample movies wear the salwar 
kameez and are represented, at least once in each of these movies, in a 
headscarf (either when they are praying, participating in religious ritual 
of death or in a formal occasion representing the Islamic nation in an 
international event), and Iram and Ek Tha Tiger’s Zoya almost always 
wear western attire, such as miniskirts with knee high boots, short 
dresses and hot pants. This ensures that the Muslim women in the 
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selected films do not challenge the status quo around the hierarchy 
between the superior, idealised and nationalist Hindu women and the 
inferior, conservative and anti-nationalist Muslim women even through 
sartorial practices.  
But for the Muslim heroines of the selected sample, western wear is still 
not ‘the norm’, particularly when they are in India. They only represent a 
form of fusion clothing practice especially when they are in public 
spheres in cosmopolitan settings, outside their family’s scrutiny. Thus 
although many Bollywood movies represent their Hindu heroines in 
western style clothing conveying a modern and cosmopolitan look, Indian 
Muslim heroines such as Ranjhanaa’s Zoya and Ishaqzade’s Zoya are 
never represented in fully western garb. Thus they are depicted as 
conservative and backward, thus inferior to the modern and 
cosmopolitan Hindu Indian characters in various other movies of today. 
This can be further explained through the representation of the two 
Pakistani Muslim heroines in predominantly sexually suggestive western 
wear. Iram and Ek Tha Tiger’s Zoya, playing Pakistani ISI agents in 
western countries wear western clothes being represented in a highly 
sexualised manner. The only time they wear ethnic clothing, is when they 
are either in the company of their fellow Muslim countrymen. In these 
movies, they entice the Hindu heroes (and other men) through their 
beauty and sexuality, are deceitful and dishonest, just like the courtesan 
characters in old Hindi films. In fact, Iram in Agent Vinod performs a 
courtesan inspired dance sequence to keep the man she is spying on 
enticed. Thus the western garb of the Pakistani spies are deployed as 
tools of seduction by their countries and they also use their sexuality 
through courtesan inspired dance to enter enemy units. Such depiction 
of the Pakistani ISI agents represent them as inferior to Indian women as 
they use their western sexualised sartorial practices to seduce the Hindu 
heroes disrupting the Heroes’ duty to the nation. While Indian women 
wear western garb as a sign of progressiveness and modernity, leading 
India into globalisation.  
Through analysing the impossibility of representing the Muslim women in 
India in either the nationalistic sari or western wear to represent their 
modernity, in the selected movies, we have demonstrated that Muslim 
women’s sartorial practices is a site through which hierarchies among the 
communities (Hindu women and Muslim women) and between India and 
Pakistan (Pakistani Muslim women and Indian women) are maintained.  
 
Conclusion 
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This article has identified a number of contexts of change in the 
representation of Muslim women in recent Bollywood movies. First 
context of change is that Muslim characters are now being portrayed as 
occupying central roles in the plots of commercially viable mainstream 
movies such as the four movies from 2012-13 discussed in this paper. 
Secondly,  there has been a distinct diversification in the portrayals of 
Muslim women in different roles and contexts. For instance, as this paper 
has shown, fulfilling roles of spy, political campaigner, etc. and making 
active choices in terms of education, career and life partners. This 
represents a change where the intersection of gender, nationalism and 
religion now form their public identities, as opposed to orientalist 
depiction of restrictive private lives of veiled women in previous 
generation of movies. The selected portrayals attempt to break free of 
the Madonna/Whore complex,9 enabling Muslim heroines to possess 
‘respectable’ yet sexually transgressive qualities which were historically 
associated only with the tawaif and had hyper sexualised negative 
connotations. Thirdly, Muslim women within India are represented in 
fusion wear, combination of eastern and western, in secular spaces such 
as the university within India and outside India; Muslim women are 
represented in western clothing as opposed to the stereotypical 
backward and conservative salwar kameez or the hijab. 
In order to make a realistic assessment of the recent representation of 
Muslim women in Bollywood, the contexts of change need to be located 
within the contexts of continuity of traditional discourse on Muslim 
women. The four selected movies represent hierarchical gender relations 
through the mediated modernity of Muslim women by the upper caste 
Hindu man. Iram seeks help from Hindu RAW agent to put an end to her 
forced espionage role. Ek Tha Tiger’s Zoya falls in love with a Hindu man 
and they start a life together where he protects her from her Muslim 
Pakistani countrymen, who are looking to penalise her for loving a Hindu 
man and betraying her country. And finally, Ranjhanaa’s Zoya and 
Ishaqzade’s Zoya are both protected by Hindu men from their 
conservative and aggressive Muslim male family members, for falling in 
love with a Sikh and Hindu man respectively. Secondly, there are strong 
elements of continuity around asymmetrical Hindu-Muslim relationship 
in India. Muslim men are still portrayed as the brash, uncivilised and 
uneducated ‘other’, from whom the Muslim women need protection. 
Muslim women are differentiated from Hindu women through sartorial 
practices, where they are never shown in a nationalist sari or fully 
                                                                    
9 Madonna/whore complex refers to the binary representation of women as 
respectable, subservient and often publicly inaccessible and he contrasting 
image of women as highly sexualised, publicly visible and accessible Tawaifs and 
dancing girls (Hirji, 2008).  
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western garb as representative of modern India. Muslim women’s 
identities are constructed through association of her clothing practices 
with her religion or sexuality, as opposed to the Hindu women who 
chooses her nation. Finally, the impossibility of a romantic relationship 
between a Pakistani woman and Indian man is still upheld, as although 
one of the inter-religious couples in the four movies end up together, 
they have to be in hiding in western countries outside both India and 
Pakistan to give their love story a happy ending. The inter-nation friction 
is represented through the impossibility of cross-border love, which is 
still unimaginable if the lovers are either in India or Pakistan. 
To summarise, we find that Bollywood tactically adopts ‘good Muslim 
women’ as a discursive troupe to reinforce the Hindu supremacist 
discourse that ‘Hindu men’ are the protectors of the Muslim women 
from the ‘bad Muslim’ men. This conceptualisation then supports and 
reinforces the opposition between the Hindu men and the Muslim men, 
laying down the attributes of the ideal Hindu man (through the choice of 
partners) as the yardstick against which the Muslim men should be 
measured. Such a discursive practice supports Das’s (2006) model that 
representation of Muslim women (and men) in Bollywood helps maintain 
a communalised, Hindu patriarchal structure among the genders, 
between Hindu-Muslim communities in India and between India and 
Pakistan as nations. We argue that ‘good Muslim’ women do not 
challenge the status quo of hierarchies between the communities, and 
through the acceptance of the benevolence of Hindu men align 
themselves with the Indian nation, simultaneously providing a discursive 
blueprint for the ‘bad Muslims’ to be accepted in the imagination of the 
Indian nation. This potentially helps maintain the Hindutva or Hindu 
supremacist moral and national order where violence against the 
Muslims are rationalised, legitimised and normalised as strategies for 
building and protecting a Hindu nation. Furthermore, the Ishrat Jahan 
fake encounter case, with which we started this article, is also an 
example of how this ideology is often also realised outside Bollywood in 
real India. The record of change vis-a-vis continuity in Muslim women’s 
representation in Bollywood is at best mixed and its future highly 
contingent on the political climate of India.  
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